CHECKS AND BALANCE:
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER
OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
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I
INTRODUCTION

Professor Lazarus's paper, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of
EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers
Themselves)?, includes an excellent review of the origins, structure, nature,
and tensions of congressional oversight of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA" or "Agency"). Regarding what may be called "tangible"
causes of increased oversight, Professor Lazarus correctly cites the growing
influence of outside interest groups, increased media coverage of
environmental issues, and the proliferation of subcommittees and
subcommittee staff.
Of particular interest, however, is his analysis of what I will call the
"intangible" factors. One "intangible" cause of the increase in congressional
oversight is the decrease in judicial scrutiny of agency action-the demise of
the "hard-look" doctrine.2 The significance of this factor cannot be
overstated.
Other intriguing concepts can be found in Professor Lazarus's review of
the challenges that are inherent in fashioning environmental policy and his
conclusion that these "embedded" factors have virtually guaranteed both the
intensity and highly adversarial quality of congressional oversight.3
Two related observations deserve attention. First, Lazarus suggests that
much of the friction between EPA and Congress can be traced to "the
collision between the aspirations of the early federal environmental laws and
the resistance of institutional and cultural forces to the changes those laws
require." 4 Congress repeatedly has passed environmental laws with goals
that are ambitious, and, on occasion, unattainable. Generally, these laws
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include requirements that will impose significant costs on at least some
sectors of the economy.
Once these complex, controversial laws are enacted, EPA is left with the
unenviable task of implementing them, frequently without adequate staff or
financial resources and on the basis of incomplete scientific understanding of
the problems. EPA has to contend not only with Congress and the laws it
passes, but with powerful, well-funded, and often reluctant regulated
industries. In addition, EPA is part of the executive branch and is
accountable, first and foremost, to the president and the overseers who work
for the president at the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and
other agencies. This leads to the second point that warrants emphasis: that
there has been "a marked lack of consensus" between the executive and
legislative branches concerning the proper direction of federal environmental
policy. 5 In fact, much of the congressional oversight directed at EPA is really
directed at OMB and the president.
In congressional oversight hearings, EPA often is forced to defend
positions with which it does not agree. It is ironic that congressional panels
often use EPA memoranda prepared for internal executive branch arguments
in oversight hearings. That EPA took the "right position" within the
executive branch (and ultimately "lost" the argument) rarely diminishes the
intensity or adversarial nature of congressional oversight.
II
THE "DISADVANTAGES"

OF OVERSIGHT

Although Professor Lazarus does an excellent job of explaining and
criticizing the congressional oversight process, his paper left me with an
uneasy feeling. Something about it did not ring true. At first, I thought his
suggested reforms, such as placing limits on the number of hearings that
could be held or instituting similar procedural hurdles designed to make
oversight a more orderly, rational process, 6 were the source of my unease.

Such reforms may make sense but, as Professor Lazarus acknowledges, they
7
are politically unrealistic and of questionable substantive importance.
The suggested reforms were not the source of my unease, however; it had
deeper roots. After reviewing the list of "disadvantages" of congressional
oversight 8 and concluding that I disagreed with five of the seven, the problem

became apparent.

Professor Lazarus's paper is based on the erroneous

premise that congressional oversight is a powerful tool that can make or break

EPA and unduly influence the implementation of federal environmental
policy. Another article by Professor Lazarus that is included in this volume
provides a more accurate, detailed assessment of the panoply of factors that
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id at 232.
Id at 235-36.
Id at 226-30.
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contribute to the difficulties encountered by EPA in implementing
environmental laws. In that article, 9 Professor Lazarus recognizes that
intense, adversarial congressional oversight is only one of many factors
influencing the implementation of federal environmental policy. When
compared with the other factors, congressional oversight in the form of
letters, meetings, press conferences, hearings, and similar tools of
intimidation is exposed as a relatively weak factor.
A review of the seven "disadvantages" cited in The Neglected Question of
Congressional Oversight and my responses to them follow.
Disadvantage 1. Oversight helps create and perpetuate EPA's image
problem and erodes public confidence in the Agency.
Response. EPA's problems with the public have little, if anything, to do
with congressional oversight. How many people who live outside
Washington, D.C. know when Congress holds an oversight hearing or
when a group of congressmen send EPA a scathing letter?
EPA's image problem and the lack of public confidence in the Agency may
be in part a result of EPA being too sophisticated. For example, a community
located near a Superfund site wants to see crews of workmen at the site
beginning immediate clean up. Residents do not understand why it takes
three years to produce studies called "RIFs" and "RODs" before the
bulldozers can get to work. Furthermore, EPA consistently fails to address
the expectations and assuage the fears of the community. This failure to
communicate has more to do with creating and perpetuating EPA's image
problem than any oversight hearing, even one that is featured on the national
evening news.
Similarly, a recent report shows little connection between EPA's priorities
and those of the public.' 0 This difference in perspective is a significant
problem for EPA and does more to erode public confidence than does
congressional oversight.
Disadvantage2. Oversight retards the evolution of environmental law, and
leads to more prescriptive statutes, wasteful expenditures for pollution
control and "missed opportunities."
Response. This issue merits an entire symposium of its own. Suffice it to
say that, as reflected in recent statutes, Congress and EPA react
differently to scientific uncertainty.'' Congress is more likely to err on
9. RichardJ. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54
L & Contemp Probs 311 (Autumn 1991).
10. Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental
Protection (Sept 1990) (Report to EPA Administrator William K. Reilly).
il. A March 4, 1986, letter to EPA Administrator Thomas from 11 of the 17 conferees who
wrote the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act exemplifies this
difference. The letter, which was prompted by publication of EPA's proposed regulation to
implement the land ban requirements of the law, noted that
use of a "decision rule," such as that being proposed by EPA, was considered by Congress.
EPA would have been authorized to determine on its own initiative that a prohibition on the
land disposal of a specified waste was not necessary to protect human health and the
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the side of caution and to risk "wasteful expenditures." The alternative
often has been little or no spending on environmental protection, and
continuing environmental degradation, while EPA works to reduce the
level of "uncertainty."
Disadvantage 3. The threat of oversight chills decisionmaking and
innovation at EPA.
Response. EPA is always free to propose new approaches to Congress.
This can be done in the context of a proposed rulemaking developed in
consultation with the "feared" congressional overseers or as a formal or
informal legislative proposal.
A good example of this consultative approach is the recently enacted acid
rain program. 12 It is innovative. It was proposed by EPA and the president,
and was approved by Congress. In fact, the Agency's experience with
pollution prevention programs shows that whatever chilling does occur
results not from congressional oversight but from internal executive branch
disputes. For example, EPA's legislative proposal on pollution prevention
was held up at OMB for several months. 1 3 When it became clear that OMB
was not going to approve the EPA proposal, it was abandoned as a legislative
initiative.
Disadvantage 4. Oversight diverts valuable, scarce Agency resources.
Response. This is true.
Disadvantage 5. Congressional oversight has tended to skew EPA
priorities.
Response. Is this bad? What makes EPA the sole arbiter of what should be
our nation's environmental priorities?
For better or worse, Congress is more responsive to the public and, as a
public agency, EPA must respond to public concerns of the moment. The
alternative is a paternalistic approach where EPA claims to know what is best
environment. However, we ultimately rejected such an approach. Because of the scientific
uncertainty inherent in decisions of this kind, Congress adopted... a statutory presumption
against the land disposal of untreated hazardous wastes and in favor of treatment . . .. The
decisionmaking process set forth in the law stresses the long-term uncertainties associated
with land disposal .... Treatment standards were selected by Congress as substitutes for
health based standards .... [EPA's proposal] to use a health based threshold as a means of
avoiding "excessive" treatment standards has some intuitive appeal. However, such an
approach assumes that a concentration level below which leachate is "safe" can be
identified. This is an assumption that we were unwilling to make .... EPA's proposal to
"cap" treatment standards with a health based threshold erroneously construes the
requirement to "minimize" threats to human health and the environment as a requirement
to "reduce such threats to an acceptable level." It is precisely this type of subjective analysis
that we were trying to avoid.
Letter from John D. Dingell, et al, to EPA Administrator Lee M. Thomas (March 4, 1986) ("Dingell
Letter").
12. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, §§ 403 et seq, 104 Stat 2399 (1990).
13. See Envir Rptr (BNA) 1246 (Nov 2, 1990) (reporting on the development by EPA of a
pollution prevention strategy after the Agency's failure to fashion a pollution prevention bill).
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and decides what the public needs. If EPA cannot garner public support for
its priorities, those priorities should be "skewed" by congressional oversight.
Disadvantage 6. Oversight affects employee self-esteem and Agency
morale.
Response. Sometimes this is true but more often than not the EPA staff
feels betrayed from within. The best information for oversight usually
comes from disgruntled employees who welcome "EPA bashing." They
do not view congressional oversight in the form of hearings, press
conferences, meetings, and letters as criticism; rather they see it as
vindication of their positions.
Disadvantage 7. Fragmented oversight exacerbates the problems
Congress has in speaking with a coherent and consistent voice.
Response. This is true.
There is no question that Congress bears equal responsibility with EPA for
both the successes and failures of federal environmental policy. The
legislation written in the 1970s and rewritten in the 1980s 4 has been
sweeping, bold, and ambitious. Maybe too sweeping, too bold, and too
ambitious.
Whatever the shortcomings of federal environmental legislation,
congressional "oversight" in the form of hearings, press conferences,
meetings, and letters is not the cause of EPA's problems. Rather, oversight is
a mirror reflecting problems that exist independently. The reflection may
intensify, magnify, or distort the image, but it does not create the image.
III
THE LIMITATIONS

OF OVERSIGHT

The real question that needs to be answered is whether Congress has the
institutional capability to engage in effective, constructive oversight that can
produce significant changes in EPA's implementation of federal environmental
policy. For several reasons, the answer is "no."
First, oversight work is detailed, complex, and tedious. On any given day,
a senator or representative may have meetings and votes on issues such as war
in the Mideast, aid to Eastern Europe, child care, farm support, abortion,
taxes, pornography, or the spotted owl. The list is endless and mindboggling. Micromanaging the technical work of EPA is the last thing
members of Congress want to do.
Second, Congress is not a single entity. It is 535 separate voices. While a
liberal senator from New England is urging EPA to take tougher stands on
wetlands issues, a caucus of Southern congressmen is meeting with EPA to
14. See, for example, Clean Air Act, 42 USC §§ 7401 et seq (1970); Clean Air Amendments of
1990 (cited in note 12); Clean Water Act, 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1987); Comprehensive Emergency
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 USC §§ 9601 et seq (1986); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC §§ 6901 et seq (1984).
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complain about its "overzealous" wetlands protection program. What is the
effect of conflicting messages from the "overseers"? Either the messages
cancel each other out or the Agency gets whip-sawed.
Third, other than threatening to cut off funds or passing new legislation,
what sort of oversight powers does Congress have? The Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit shed light on the nature of congressional oversight powers in
1989 in one of the series of cases entitled Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
U.S. EPA.' 5 EPA had proposed a rule to control implementation of the land
ban that was part of the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 16 In March 1986, in a rare display of bipartisan,
bicameral support for a single position, eleven of the seventeen conferees
who wrote the land ban portion of the 1984 amendments sent a detailed letter
to the EPA administrator objecting to the proposal and asserting that it was
7
contrary to congressional intent.'
On the basis of the letter, EPA changed the proposal. The Chemical
Manufacturers' Association, an industry group that preferred the original
proposal, challenged in court EPA's change in position. In a per curiam
opinion, the court of appeals considered the conferees' letter and EPA's
reliance on it to justify its change in position.
It should go without saying that members of Congress have no power, once a statute
has been passed, to alter its interpretation by post-hoc "explanations" of what it
means; there may be societies where "history" belongs to those in power, but ours is
not among them. In our scheme of things, we consider legislative history because it is
just that: history. It forms the background against which Congress adopted the
relevant statute. Post-enactment statements are a different matter, and they are not to
be considered by an agency or by a court as legislative history. An agency has an
obligation to consider the comments of legislators, of course, but on the same footing
as it would those of other commenters; such comments may have, as Justice
Frankfurter said in a different context, "power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." 18

The matter was then remanded to EPA with instructions to formulate a
justification that did not rely on the letter from Congress.
IV
CONCLUSION

The traditional forms of congressional oversight designed to intimidate
the agency are used regularly and, on any given day, may be used by several
members of Congress with competing interests and goals. These tools of
intimidation include letters, meetings, and various public displays, such as
press conferences and hearings.
15. 886 F2d 355 (DC Cir 1989).
16. 42 USC §§ 6901 et seq (1984).
17. See note 11.
18. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 886 F2d at 365, quoting Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 US 134,
140 (1944). A similar point was made by the Supreme Court in Bowsherv Synar, 478 US 714 (1986).
The Court held that, once it has enacted legislation, "Congress can thereafter control the execution
of its enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation." Id at 733-34.
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With respect to the hundreds or thousands of relatively minor decisions
confronting EPA, congressional oversight, or the mere threat of oversight,
can be used to alter agency behavior and to change decisions. With respect to
the major policy decisions, however-decisions that shape federal
environmental policy-traditional forms of congressional oversight have
limited effect. Behavior may be altered, but rarely are decisions altered solely
as a result of congressional oversight. When a major policy question is
working its way through the system (first within EPA and then within the
executive branch as a whole), the voices heard from Congress in the name of
"oversight" are treated just like those from any other interest group.
Over the past twenty years, it has become apparent to members of
Congress who want to influence major policy decisions at EPA that the most
effective form of oversight is detailed, prescriptive legislation. For example,
the original 1970 Clean Air Act 19 was reportedly only thirty-five pages long.
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act 20 include more than 350 pages of
specific legislative directives to EPA, a tenfold increase.
There is a faint ray of hope for those who question the wisdom of 300- and
400-page reauthorizations. Just before the 101st Congress adjourned,
Superfund was quietly and efficiently reauthorized without amendment for
three years as part of the budget agreement. This feat, however, is not likely
to be repeated often.
The trend toward more specific, detailed environmental legislation is the
result of many factors, including the demise of the hard look doctrine
mentioned earlier and the related, increased tendency of courts to interpret
the environmental laws of the past twenty years in a manner that grants EPA
considerable discretion. Even in cases where Congress took great pains to
include specific statutory mandates and to eliminate agency discretion, the
courts have found "ambiguity" and granted EPA discretion that was not
intended by the authors of the statute.
For example, in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. U.S. EPA, 2 ' despite the
1986 letter from a bipartisan, bicameral majority of the authors of the 1984
RCRA amendments (in which the senators and representatives argued that
EPA's original proposal for implementing the 1984 land ban provisions was
not authorized by the law and that the approach outlined by EPA was
specifically rejected by the conferees), the court suggested that EPA's original
proposal would have been upheld. 2 2 If the courts continue to frustrate the
intent of those who write the laws by finding discretion even where none was
intended, it should not surprise anyone to find lawmakers writing new laws
that are even more prescriptive and that state with greater clarity the limits of
EPA's discretion.
19.
20.
21.
22.

42 USC §§ 7401 et seq (1970).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, §§ 101 et seq, 104 Stat 2399 (1990).
886 F2d 355 (DC Cir 1989).
Id at 362-64.
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Viewing congressional oversight in the broadest context-as a
combination of intimidation tactics and the enactment of new legislation-and
recognizing that the 1980s was a decade that produced massive, detailed
legislative revisions of the federal environmental laws first enacted in the
1970s, there are two questions we should ponder. First, were the 1980s
simply a reaction to the combined factors of (1) abuse and corruption at EPA
during the early years of the Reagan Administration and (2) congressional
underestimation of the scope and complexity of the problems in the early
1970s? Second, is the 1980s trend toward ever greater legislative detail a sign
of things to come?

